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Interfirm late payments are a hot issue in the EU, as witnessed by the 1998 bills passed in Italy and 
in the U.K. and by the soon to be approved EU Directive. Comprehensive information, especially 
on the effective own cost, is however almost absent in the literature. The paper provides the first 
detailed evidence of the trade debt own cost for the Italian manufacturing firms, arising out of 
discounts offered and of penalties for late payments. It is shown that, comparing also self-defined 
bank lending rationed and non rationed firms, interfirm credit received is, if ever, only slightly more 
expensive than bank credit. Cross-section econometric analysis, besides establishing the greater 
reactivity of credit received rather than granted to the external funds implicit cost, finds that the 
discount offered for early payments affects significantly credit granted to buyers. The estimates 
obtained for the basic specifications are robust when the sample is split according to various 
criteria; larger firms, probably because less financially constrained, react more strongly to sales 
reductions via longer credit and debt periods.            
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1. Introduction 
Interfirm credit is an often neglected theme in the theoretical and empirical 
studies on the heterogeneity of financial systems among EMU countries and on 
the regional implications for the transmission mechanism of a single monetary 
policy (see for instance Schmidt, 1999). A careful scrutiny of the subject is 
however warranted for at least two reasons. First, widely different national 
practices and legislation disrupt the EU single market objective, thus hindering the 
development of financial techniques such as trade credit securitization and 
obstructing the assessment of firms' creditworthiness, because of the different 
incidence of trade credit (TC)
1 in their books. A stylised fact is that the share of 
TC among liabilities is greater in France, Italy, Portugal, Spain; there is also 
evidence, in the recent past, in Italy  (Marotta 1997b) and in France (Dietsch-
Kemp 1998, Dietsch 1998), of a TC reallocation from smaller to larger firms, with 
a strengthening of a structural dependence of the former from banks. Second, the 
comparability across the EU of effective prices, though expressed in euro, is 
undermined if the discounts for quicker settlements are neglected
2.  
Institutional innovations, such as the legislation introduced in Italy
3 and in 
the U.K.
4 or the soon to be approved by the European Parliament EU draft 
directive on late payments, are however bound to modify the balance between 
larger and smaller firms. A likely development, at least in the Mediterranean 
countries, is a changed composition of bank borrowers by size and the growth of  
markets for short-term financing instruments such as commercial paper, with a 
pattern of relationships between banks and firms and within firms more similar to 
what is thought to be standard in the US literature. To name only three well-
known papers, the common theme underlying the theoretical discussion of credit 
rationing in Jaffee-Stiglitz (1990), the examination of some implications of the 
credit view in Kashyap et al. (1993) and the justification for identifying 
empirically credit rationed firms with the dependence on TC taken in Petersen-
                                                            
1 A terminological clarification can be helpful. Trade credit can be treated as if  interfirm credit, 
provided final consumers’ (households or public sector) share in direct sales is sufficiently small. 
This assumption is roughly acceptable if firms, as in this study, belong to the manufacturing sector 
(see also fn 28). 
2 Blinder et al. (1998) find that price stickiness, according to the managers surveyed, is de facto 
accompanied by changes in non price contractual terms, including terms of payment.      
3 The bill was approved on June 16
th, 1998. 
4 Late payment of commercial debts (interest) Act 1998.   2 
Rajan (1994), is that larger firms, exploiting their superior credit standing with 
banks and financial markets, act as an intermediary granting longer payment 
delays when the smaller firms are credit squeezed during a  monetary restriction. 
The coincidence of the introduction of the new legislation in Italy – a 
country whose economic and financial structure make an almost ideal 
environment for the credit view approach (Cecchetti 1999) - with the start of the 
EMU motivates a research on its likely effects. A first step is an enquiry on the 
TC terms: effective cost, contractual and real time interval before settlement, 
penalties for late payments. On all of these crucial aspects the literature provides 
only scattered information, with the recent partial exceptions of Ng et al. (1999) 
and Wilner (2000) for the United States. One of the contributions of this paper is 
to fill this information gap for the Italian manufacturing sector exploiting the 
Mediocredito Centrale dataset (1997). 
    The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a comparison on 
terms of payments in the EU countries, summarises some issues on the 
implications of bank-firm relationships in the Italian case and illustrates the main 
features of the new legislation in Italy and in the U.K. and of the coming draft EU 
directive. Section 3 describes the Mediocredito Centrale database and illustrates 
an explorative analysis of interfirm credit, based on the answers to a specific 
survey and on a set of financial indicators; the last subsection concentrates on the 
link bank credit rationing-commercial debt. Section 4 provides a cross-section 
econometric analysis on trade gross credit and debt and on net credit, with a 
special focus on heterogeneous behaviour by firm size. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Trade credit: an international comparison 
Though perhaps surprising, the literature does not provide information on 
the effective cost of trade debt. Even in the U.S., recent papers (Ng et al. 1999, 
Wilner 2000) show how, even if more costly with respect to short term loans, the 
spread cannot be easily computed, because it depends on how common is the two-
part contract, including discount for quicker settlements, and on the size of, and 
how frequent are, penalties for late payments
5. 
                                                            
5 As Ng et al. (1999) remark, before their paper, based on an original survey, the only 
documentation sufficiently detailed for the U.S., though with a focus on sectors rather than on 
individual firms, is dated 1970, based on the records of Dun & Bradstreet in the management of 
receivables of medium-large firms in various countries.    3 
In Europe, though with non homogeneous data on contractual and 
effective credit periods, not on the totally unavailable  own cost, the differences 
across countries are wide, as often remarked by the European Commission, who 
has tried to promote, during the early 90’s, a greater harmonization, at first 
through the softer instrument of a recommendation to the States and later through 
a directive. Overall, the anedoctal evidence at mid 90’s pointed to Italy as the 
country in the EU with longer effective credit periods - from one third to two 
thirds longer - and average delays beyond agreed dates (Table 1). The shortest 
period was found in Germany, a country where a 2 per cent discount is usually 
granted for payments within 15 days, even though with sizable differences across 
sectors (Harhoff-Körting 1998). The information does not basically differ from 
what reported for 1999 by Dun and Bradstreet on contractual time terms and on 
effective delays for trade financing among its customers, mostly medium-sized to 
large firms (Table 2). 
A comparison among the main EMU countries, based on a representative 
sample of the manufacturing sector, can be done through the harmonised accounts 
data base BACH (Bardes 2000). The ratios to total assets of TC granted and taken  
in the period 1989-1997 are stably ranked across countries, with Italy on top (in 
the last year, respectively 35 and 25 per cent), followed by Spain (27 and 23 per 
cent) and France (25 and 20 per cent), while Germany’s indicators are 
significantly lower (10 and 7 per cent)
6. A divergent trend for the two ratios shows 
up however during the period: the first one falls everywhere, most especially in 
France and in Germany; the second one, instead, rises in Italy and in Spain and 
falls in the other two countries. On average 1998 data for France, the indicator of 
days of credit
7 goes from 76 for medium-sized/small firms to 72 for large ones  to 
71 for smaller ones; the days of debt indicator
8 goes from around 74 for smaller 
and medium-sized/small firms to 71 for the larger ones. For Spain, the 1995 
median values for the days of credit and debt indicators are 92 and 100 
(Hernandéz de Cos-Hernando 1998). 
                                                            
6 German data are even slightly lower than US ones. Of course, the usual caveat on international 
comparisons of accounts data applies. In Germany, for instance, trade credit and debt are net of the 
items vis-à-vis other firms in the same group. 
7 Days of credit = [end of year trade credit/sales]*360 days.
 
8 Days of debt = [end of year trade debt/purchases]*360 days.   4 
2.1 The Italian case: a closer look 
A stylised fact in the Italian manufacturing sector was the persistent, in the 
80’s and early 90’s, reallocation of net TC granted from medium-sized and 
smaller firms to larger ones (Marotta 1997b). A back-of-the-envelope estimate 
suggests how sizable were the implied extra interest charges paid to banks on the 
stock of loans required, assuming a one to one substitution rate, to finance net TC 
extension through the lengthening of credit periods beyond a stated date (say, 90 
or 60 days). In the decade 1984-1993, "excess" (relative to 90 days) net trade 
credit, as a ratio to outstanding short term loans,  was on average for large, non-
state controlled, firms 20 percentage points less than for medium-sized ones in the 
Mediobanca open sample. Assuming conservatively as an opportunity cost the 
average lending rate, which disregards the lower rates practiced to larger firms 
and the surcharges for very short term uncollateralized loans, the extra financial 
charges, as a percent of the effective ones on bank loans, can be estimated to be 
25 and 6 per cent, respectively for medium-sized and large ones, with a 90-days 
stated date (34 and 14 with a 60-days date).  
This counterfactual exercise shows how the credit period width generates a 
relevant cost for the Italian non-financial sector, in aggregate
9, with opaque 
distributive effects within it and a much increased financial fragility for some 
components, which partly offsets, through a higher borrowers’ credit risk, the 
overall benefit for the banking sector.    
2.2 Institutional innovations in the EU 
The common feature of the legislation introduced in 1998 in Italy and in 
the U.K. were an explicit penalty rate for late payments and the provision of 
shorter credit periods. To be more specific on this last point, in the Italian case, 
contracts between private parties should by default be written and payments 
scheduled within 60 days (within 90 days in case of regional or national 
agreements)
10. Late payments imply a penalty interest rate on the principal owed 
of at least 500 basis points above the EBC marginal refinancing rate. Moreover, if 
the delay exceeds 30 days, the debtor pays an extra penalty of a 5 per cent of its 
debt.  
                                                            
9 Being the small firms almost totally missing in the Mediobanca sample, the estimates are 
definitely downward biased.   
10 As can be easily gauged inspecting Tables 1 and 2, the time limits are far lower than the 
effective ones so far.   5 
The European Council has approved in May 2000 a draft directive, that 
should be definitely passed by the European Parliament this year (and adopted in 
the national legislation by the EU countries within the next two years), with the 
following key features: a standard 30 days credit period (60 only for some types 
of contracts); a default penalty interest rate of at least a 800 basis points spread 
above the EBC main refinancing operations interest rate
11; the rules apply to 
private and, a key difference with respect to current Italian legislation, to public 
sector contracting parties. 
3. Cost and length of trade credit in the Italian manufacturing 
sector  
The 1994 edition of the triennial Mediocredito Centrale survey on more 
than 5000 manufacturing firms – a representative sample for the ones with 11 to 
500 employees and every one with more than 500 employees - includes a 
questionnaire on TC taken and extended. This database allows for the first time to 
gather in a systematic way information on the components of the TC effective 
own cost in the Italian manufacturing sector: discounts taken and offered for 
quicker settlements, penalties for late payments, how common are these practices. 
The sample size, even after the shrinking to a maximum of 1549 firms, due to 
missing values and accounts data internal inconsistency (Appendix 1),  with an 
under-representation of smaller firms (as hinted by the high, for Italian standards, 
average employees in the first quintile; Table 4), is comparable with the few 
available studies
12.  
3.1 Methodological issues 
The potentially most attractive feature of the database is the rather in-depth 
questionnaire on TC taken, whereas only two questions refer to TC extended, with 
answers that can be linked to idiosyncratic characteristics of firms and to accounts 
data for the period 1989-94. However, besides the issues of missing answers and 
of anomalous accounts data, the structure of the questionnaire raises some 
methodological issues when interpreting the gathered information. 
                                                            
11 Being this rate included in the corridor having the marginal refinancing rate as an upper limit, 
the minimum penalty interest rate is de facto similar in the Italian law and in the EU draft 
directive. 
12 For instance, the data used by Ng et al. (1999) were obtained from a survey originally addressed 
to 2538 firms, subsequently reduced to 950, of which 747 in the manufacturing sector.   6 
1.  The answers, clustered around some focal points (see for instance the 
average period of TC taken, the average delays beyond contractual agreements, 
discounts offered or extended for quicker settlements), seem to mirror what an 
interviewee thinks to be the "normal" practice in the sector the firm belongs to, 
rather than the individual case. The low variability of the data thus gathered 
severely hinders an econometric investigation linking their determinants to firms’ 
idiosyncratic features. 
2.  All answers refer separately to three contracting parties of the surveyed 
firm: other firms in the same group, non-group Italian and foreign firms. 
Unfortunately, for  the first and the third category there is a severe drop in 
answers; moreover, the questionnaire structure does not include a grand total for 
each question, a rather serious weakness because it prevents checking for the 
mutual consistency of single items and, as in the case of TC taken and given 
annual flows, for the compatibility with the stock figures in the balance sheet and 
with the underlying transaction variables (sales and purchases) in the income 
accounts. 
3.  There is a question on whether an offer was made or received for discounts 
for quicker settlements; there is not, however, a question on whether the proposal 
was accepted. 
For these reasons, the econometric analysis uses predominantly accounts 
data; the answers to the questionnaire will be mainly used in order to examine 
more closely a given phenomenon on some suitably defined subsets of answering 
firms. 
3.2 An exploratory data analysis  
This subsection illustrates the results of a descriptive data exploration. 
1.  The average period of the TC taken vis-à-vis Italian independent 
suppliers is greater than with respect to foreign ones, though with a high 
dispersion across firms; the difference, detected both on average and median data, 
does not show up in the 25
th or in 75
th quantile. It is also interesting to remark that 
the difference widens with the asset size, more noticeably in the case of Italian 
suppliers; the phenomenon surfaces only comparing the lower fifth with the 
remaining firms, when sales are used as a dimensional indicator. The average 
contractual credit period with Italian parties, reflecting the perception of the   7 
“normal” practice in each sector  rather than the individual experience, is of about 
three times the normal length (one month) according to the draft directive
13.  
2. The proportion of suppliers offering discounts is low on average 
(slightly above 8 per cent for the Italian ones and almost 5 for the foreigners). 
Moreover, the option is available to a limited subset of firms: the median value is 
in fact zero for the Italian suppliers, going to 5 per cent only in the 75
th quantile; 
this statistic is zero for foreign suppliers. Looking closely at the dimensional cells, 
smaller firms (in the lower fifth for total assets, up to the 60
th quantile for sales) 
receive most discount offers. 
3. The annual rate of interest implied by the discount offered for 
settlements 30 days earlier than the agreed credit period is on average (using the 
2.9 per cent discount for Italian suppliers) 12.5 per cent if the agreed period is 120 
days (19.3 and 23.6 per cent, respectively, for 90 or 80 days)
14. It is useful to 
notice that short term bank lending rate was in 1994, on average, 11.2 per cent, a 
figure bounding from below the average rate for uncollateralized very short term 
loans, i.e. the closest substitute to TC taken
15. Discounts offered hardly suggest a 
definite cost advantage for bank lending compared to TC, as is the usual result in 
the U.S. experience, with implied interest rates, based on the two-part contract, 
above 40 per cent (Ng et al. 1999). It is interesting to notice that discount size is 
negatively correlated with firms’ dimension: a plausible explanation could be the 
incentive for suppliers to mitigate credit and liquidity risks. From the debtor point 
of view, however, given that also bank lending rates show a similar correlation 
                                                            
13 The 1999 data in Table 2 suggest that the situation has not changed compared to 1994, the year 
of the Mediocredito survey.  
14 Given the wording of the question (see Appendix 1), the offered discount can be expressed as 
the classical two-part contractual formula d/D, n/N, where D = 30 and N = 120, 90 or 80 days,  
with an implied annual rate, computed as: 























. On 1999 data, the implied rate, with d = 1.95%, D 
= 15 -  a clause according to Dun & Bradstreet (2000) applied in the 2.5% of  Italian large firms  -  
is equal 17.1 per cent,  9.9 or 7 for N = 60, 90 or 120 days.  
   
15 It may be useful to remember that the closest approximation to the ECB marginal refinancing 
for the Bank of Italy, namely the discount rate plus a policy determined spread (tasso per le 
anticipazioni fisse) was in 1994 around  8.5 per cent. A counterfactual application of the 1998 
Italian legislation would imply a penalizing rate for late payments  equal to 13.5 per cent, quite 
similar to the effective average bank lending rate.    8 
(see Table 4, for the implied cost of external funding; see Appendix 2 for how it is 
computed), the cost differential could be uncorrelated with firms’ size. 
4.  The above result - cost considerations are, if ever, a weak incentive 
to taking less TC - is corroborated by the very low probability of penalties for late 
payments (slightly over 4 per cent for Italian suppliers and almost zero for foreign 
ones). Even though the reduced number of answers suggests caution, a positive 
proportion at most in the upper fourth of interviewees is a striking finding;   
surprising is also the low incidence of acknowledged late payments. The positive 
correlation between the proportion of late payments and total assets does not show 
up when firms are ordered by sales: this latter finding is also noticed in the 1999 
Dun & Bradstreet (2000) survey and is rationalized with the argument that shorter 
delays of Italian larger firms arise because of the longer contractual credit periods 
they are able to obtain
16. On average, the proportion of late payments vis-à-vis 
foreign suppliers is a half compared to Italian ones.  
5. With  the  caveat of few answers, penalties are imposed only after 
sizable delays in settlements (one to two months). The question on the size of the 
penalty, if ever imposed by Italian suppliers for a month of delay,  has even fewer 
answers (62; just 7 for the foreign suppliers): the median values for Italian 
suppliers generate an implicit annual interest rate of approximately 20 per cent, 
comparable with the ones computed for discounts for quicker settlements. 
6.  At least a half of firms state that they do not offer discounts for 
settlements 30 days earlier than the agreed credit period. The implied interest rate 
is on average even lower than for TC taken, going from 7.5 to 9.1 per cent 
according to whether the credit period is 90 or 80 days. The first finding is 
somehow puzzling, if compared to the Ng et al. (1999) result, for the U.S., of a 
much lower proportion - only a quarter of firms, manufacturing and not - than in 
Italy offering a two-part TC contract. We take this finding as a further warning 
against the commonly held view of a typical (for the US) d/D,  n/N contract (see 
Jaffee-Stiglitz 1990, Petersen-Rajan 1997), when in fact it is adopted by only a 
minority of firms.  
Table 4 summarizes, keeping the same firms' ordering, some indicators 
computed from accounts data, that allow a greater comparability with most other 
                                                            
16 Considering the effective credit periods of the 50 largest Italian firms, 42% settles after more 
than 90 days, compared to only 23% for all Italian firms surveyed (Dun & Bradstreet 2000).   9 
studies and at the same time a better interpretation of the answers to the 
questionnaire. Some aspects deserve comments. 
1.  The average number of employees in the 25
th quantile - 33 - signals the 
low incidence of small and micro firms in the sample. This is a serious warning on 
how well the sample is representative for the entire manufacturing sector: in 1996, 
the average labor force (employees and self-employed) per manufacturing firm 
was 8.9, lower than in 1991 (9.5). 1994 was a year of recovery, as witnessed by 
the high growth rates of nominal (and real) sales, though with an uneven 
distribution across dimensional classes: closely inspecting the quintiles by sales, it 
is easy to spot a positive correlation between levels and growth rates of sales. 
2.  The days of credit and debt indicators are on average larger than 4 months; 
for one fourth of firms they are larger than 5. A comparison with the average 
credit period answer in the questionnaire, under the joint hypothesis of an infra-
annual and within size cell uniform distribution of underlying transactions
17,  
suggests that ex post delays in settling obligations are systematic and at least 
longer than 30 days, as acknowledged by the few firms answering this question 
(see Table 3). Examining more closely the cell values, the days of credit indicator 
is on average similar for the first four fifths (by sales)  of firms, falling only for 
the largest fifth; a positive correlation can be detected instead ordering firms by 
total assets. The days of debt indicator (median values), slightly positively 
correlated with the total assets, shows a clear negative correlation with sales.  This 
last result contrasts with direct surveys as the, already quoted, Dun & Bradstreet 
(2000) one. Finally, net TC is negative for at least a fourth of firms; the ratio to 
sales rises quite regularly with total assets and, more slowly, with sales
18. 
3. The ratio of TC taken to short term bank loans is on average 
approximately one, with a widely scattered distribution, as shown by a median 
value of 0.7; the highest values show up in the 20
th and in the 80
th quantiles. The 
argument put forward in Petersen-Rajan (1994) – TC taken is a financing 
instrument used by (small) firms more likely to be credit rationed – fits with this 
                                                            
17 Evidence indicating that the different number of cases per cell does not invalidates the exercise 
is available on request. 
18 Comparing firms with positive and negative net TC, the latter are slightly over 27 % of the total, 
and are smaller (65 employees vs 81 on average), with a higher implied cost for external funding 
(22 vs 17.3 per cent), a lower TC taken to bank loans ratio (0.65 vs 1.13), a lower proportion of 
late payments (5.1 vs 6 per cent), a lower gross operating profits to value added ratio (5.5 vs 6.3   10 
result for smaller firms; it does not for larger ones, with a sophisticated financial 
expertise that should enable them to correctly rank by cost the two financing 
instruments.  
4.  The implied cost of external funding is negatively correlated with firm 
size, most especially when taking into account the median values. 
 
3.3 Credit rationing 
The logical link between smaller firms rationed in the bank credit market 
and recourse to the more expensive TC granted by the larger firms is, in the Italian 
case, highly implausible on a priori grounds; the information drawn from the 
Mediocredito Centrale database provides empirical support to this proposition 
(Table 5). 
Firms are asked two questions, in order to ascertain whether they are credit 
rationed: first, have they applied for larger loans than in fact obtained; second, 
would they have accepted to pay more (for the exact wording, see Appendix 1)?
19 
Under the usual caveat for the few observations on firms acknowledging to be 
rationed (6 per cent)
20, a rather large set of indicators computed for rationed and 
non rationed firms suggest no links with the amount of TC taken and granted: 
days of credit and debt, implied cost for external funding, sales growth rate, ROA 
are, on average, the same; loan growth rate is even higher for rationed firms
21. The 
only hints of a link between financial fragility and a TC larger demand for 
rationed firms are a lower quick ratio and a higher TC taken to bank loans ratio 
for the latter.           
4. Econometric analysis 
The focus of the econometric investigation is on the TC granted to sales 
and on the TC taken to purchases ratios, computed from accounts data and 
therefore including also the delays beyond agreed dates. A further motivation for 
this choice is that it allows to consider the relationships with all suppliers and 
                                                                                                                                                               
per cent). The two types of firms, instead, do not differ on average for growth rates of sales, return 
on assets (ROA) and qualitative indicators on credit rationing.   
19 For a careful discussion of how and whether these questions relate to credit rationing theories 
see Messori (1999, pp. 285-6).  
20 Just an illuminating example: only 3 firms answer differently to the two questions, but average 
and median values for employees differ by 12.    
21 The ratio of self-financed investment (ratio to fixed investment expenditure of gross operating 
surplus, not reported) is similar as well across rationed and non-rationed firms.     11 
buyers, an obvious requirement inhibited by the missing grand total in the 
questionnaire structure. 
As it is well-known (see Petersen-Rajan 1997), accounts data on TC, with 
no matching with the corresponding parties, do not allow to disentangle demand 
and supply motivations for the single firm: explanatory equations are bound to be 
reduced forms. The determinants can be classified as “transaction” and 
“financial”, a loose approximation given the double nature of TC as a financing 
and a marketing instrument (see Schwartz-Withcomb 1979; Brennan et al. 1988; 
for a survey of micro and macro trade credit theories see also Marotta 1992). A set 
of idiosyncratic variables – financial strength, reputation, organizational 
complexity – can as well be interpreted from both a transactions and a financial 
perspective.  On the one hand, the  “customary” features of interfirm trade – 
sector and region firms belong to, inclusion in a group, openness to foreign 
markets (with parties practicing different rules) etc. - can be easily classified as 
transaction variables; on the other hand, almost always they can be interpreted as 
determinants of a firm’s credit and liquidity risks, and consequently of the ability 
to attract external funding. The inevitable difficulties of rationalizing sign and size 
of estimated coefficients in equations “explaining” trade credit and debt, can be 
partially mitigated through a battery of robustness checks, such as the estimation 
of equations for net TC (as in Marotta 1997b), but also, as done in this study,  
exploiting the opportunities of suitably splitting the sample thanks to the answer 
to the questionnaire.  
The basic assumption underlying the interpretation of the econometric 
results in this Section is, in contrast with the US experience, the low cost 
differential of TC taken compared to bank lending, because of the scarcity of TC 
two-part contracts and of penalties for late payments. The few answers on the 
proportion and the size of discount offers received (see Table 3) does not 
unfortunately allow to compute a reliable indicator of the TC taken own cost: it is 
implicitly included in the constant in the estimated equations where the other 
element of the cost differential – bank lending rate, proxied by the implied 
external funding rate
22 - appears. 
                                                            
22 The approximation is acceptable in the 1994 Italian case because debt financing is almost 
exclusively bank lending, mostly short term.    12 
4.1 Basic specifications 
4.1.1 Commercial debt 
A basic specification of the reduced form equation for the TC taken to 
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A higher implied cost of external funding ( r ) should, from the demand 
side, lengthen the debt period. A higher value of an indicator of profitability 
(ROA)
23 can have two opposite effects: being the signal of a superior managerial 
ability, it could reduce the association of a firm with the use of an “unfair” 
instrument, such as postponing debt settlements with suppliers; taken as an 
indicator of creditworthiness, it could increase the willingness of the latter to 
supply credit. The last argument, however, is less plausible, because the short 
term nature of TC makes more relevant the liquidity risk – i.e. the risk of delayed 
payments – rather than the credit risk. The gross operating profit to sales margin 
(marg) can also be read as a liquidity risk indicator, because it reflects the ability 
to generate cash flow: for this reason, the expected sign is positive. Firm’s age 
(age) is usually introduced, in the literature on long term lending relationships, as 
a proxy for the borrower’s reputation, with a positive expected sign. 
Among the “transaction” determinants, some are control variables for the 4 
Pavitt macrosectors, for the region (REG) where the firm operates and for the type 
of production and of marketing channels (type)
24. A higher proportion of sales 
through own distributive channels to detailers or trough wholesalers, reducing the 
risk of finding final buyers, should lower the incentive to lengthen the period debt 
to the suppliers, waiting for settlement by buyers; an opposite case could be made 
with a higher proportion of sales as subcontractor or with the public sector as the 
other contracting party, because a firm could transfer to its own suppliers the 
delays of these customers, most especially – in the Italian case - of the latter one 
                                                            
23 A better indicator of profitability, such as ROE, was discarded because of data problems in the 
income accounts for a large number of firms.    
24 Though firms provide the proportion of sales for each category, the resulting regressors are 
similar to dummies, because of the low number of firms reporting positive values. See also 
footnote 28.   13 
(see Marotta 1995)
25. The coefficient expected sign of the (log of) purchases per 
supplier (unitprch) is uncertain: a firm with more dependent suppliers could enjoy 
a monopsonistic power in setting longer debt periods; however, the same indicator 
could instead proxy suppliers’ greater contractual leverage, with an opposite effect 
on deb. 
Finally, in order to control for cyclical effects
26, the specification includes 
sales growth rate (g) for the last two years, separately for positive and negative 
variations, in order to account for asymmetric effects of cyclical downturns on 
deb. The same reasoning motivates the inclusion of both negative and positive 
ROA. 
The OLS estimates of the basic specification for 957 firms fit overall the a 
priori, with many highly significant regressors (Table 6, column (1))
27.  r enters 
positively signed and with a non negligible effect: one additional percentage point 
translates in 0,17 per cent higher deb. One additional percentage point of marg, 
taken as a proxy of a lower liquidity risk, corresponds to an increase in deb by a 
half percentage point. The negatively signed ROA supports this interpretation: 
firms with inferior managerial ability try to offset this weakness by lengthening 
debt periods, and this is particularly so (absolute value of the coefficient larger by 
a half) when ROA is negative. The same asymmetric effect, with a larger absolute 
value of the coefficient, shows up for g, contemporaneous and one-year lagged.  
As expected, because the very short term nature of TC downplays the role of the 
credit risk, of which a good proxy can be firm age, this regressor has a low 
statistical significance; the negative sign, moreover, does not fit a reputational 
interpretation.   
Among the transaction variables, the negatively signed unitprch suggests 
that the bargaining power of (large) suppliers more than offsets the monopsonistic 
leverage of their contracting parties; with the expected positive sign, and jointly 
highly significant, are the type variables
28. The relevance of nationwide customary 
                                                            
25 A raw materials and unfinished goods inventories turnover indicator, a priori with an expected 
negative sign, turned out always to be hardly significant (t statistic less than one). 
26 Though annual data do not allow to account for the mechanical effects of the cycle on 
infraannual items, we try this way to control for the heterogeneity, across firms’ size, of sales 
growth rates detected in table 4.   
27 Besides the usual statistic of explained variability (corrected R
2), the DW statistic is also 
reported, as a generic misspecification indicator. 
28 Estimates omitting these variables were carried out, in order to check for their dummy effect, 
being variables with positive values only for a reduced subset of firms. More precisely, of the 1115   14 
practices by sectors is signaled by the high/very low joint significance of the 
Pavitt macrosectors/regions dummies. 
The other columns in Table 6 report the estimates on two subsets of firms, 
chosen according to the answer on whether they grant a discount to contracting 
parties (only Italian, not belonging to the same group, in order to get a sufficiently 
high number of valid answers
29) for settlements 30 days earlier than the agreed 
debt period. The underlying rationale is that an active credit management is a clue 
to a firm greater financial ability, and consequently to a greater reactivity to other 
financial determinants. Indeed, comparing the estimates of column (2), for firms 
who practice discount policies, with the other ones who do not (column (3)), the 
former show coefficients with larger absolute values and higher statistical 
significance for the financial variables – r,  ROA,  marg – to the detriment of 
“transaction” variables. 
Column (4) reports the estimates of the basic specification for the subset of 
exporting firms: besides a further successful check of robustness of the estimates 
of column (1) for a sample shrunk by a fourth, the choice is motivated by reasons 
of comparison with the subsequent equation for gross and net TC, which include 
among their regressors the proportion of sales abroad. 
4.1.2 Commercial credit 
A basic specification for TC offered (as a ratio to sales, cre) is the 
following:  
ε η δ γ




+ + + +
















exp group g g disc quick ROA marg r cre
   
The equation is similar to the previous one for deb; the interpretation of 
some determinants is however different, because of the likely prevalence of the 
marketing over the financial investment instrument role of TC granted. Extending 
credit periods can be a valuable tool to stabilize sales (hence a negatively signed 
g), though with likely asymmetric effects for positive or negative changes in sales, 
as well as to implement a structural implicit price discrimination policy 
                                                                                                                                                               
firms providing valid answers, zero values are found at least up to the eighth, the seventh and the 
sixth decile for the proportion of sales to the public sector, to detailers and to wholesalers or out of 
subcontracting, respectively. The coefficient estimates for the main explanatory variables turn out 
highly robust (results available on request).      
29 Out of the 1087 valid answers, almost a half have a value of zero.   15 
(positively signed g). An element enabling to better carry on the latter is, as 
suggested in Petersen-Rajan (1997), a high gross profit to sales margin (marg), 
because it generates the required resources and incentives, at margin, sales. An 
additional variable, and this is a novel contribution of the study, is the size of the 
discount (disc) firms acknowledge they offer for settlements 30 days earlier than 
the agreed date to Italian parties not belonging to the same group, with expected 
negative sign. 
Considering the financial variables strictu sensu, for given r, with expected 
negative sign even though unlikely to be highly significant because of the 
prevailing above mentioned marketing aspects, the liquidity position, proxied by 
the  quick ratio (liquid assets to current liabilities, net of the commercial 
component), should enter negatively signed, if a higher value disincentives 
promoting sales through the investment in a low-return financial instrument such 
as TC
30. This interpretation would be buttressed should a negative coefficient of 
an indicator of economic profitability, such as ROA, confirm that better managed 
firms, ceteris paribus, do not use the expensive TC
31. Finally, the TC opportunity 
cost can be mitigated if the firm belongs to a group, because of the enhanced 
credit standing; it must be remembered, however, that the data do not allow, for a 
sufficiently large number of firms, to measure the infragroup component of TC, 
with the obvious consequences of possible distortions caused by policies aiming 
at a suitable localization of profits in order to minimize the overall tax burden. 
An important, and additional, indicator of the type of customers is the 
proportion of exports to sales (exp)
32; because of the known shorter credit periods 
in the other larger EU countries and in the US, the expected sign is negative.  
The OLS estimates lend overall support to the a priori (Table 7)
33. 
Looking at column (1), the negatively signed g, contemporaneous and lagged 
once, is easily rationalized on the grounds of stabilizing sales around the levels 
                                                            
30 The indicator is computed on end-1993 data, in order to avoid simultaneity effects with the 
dependent variable, because of accounting identities. Estimates with the indicator computed on 
end-1994 data are not however sizably different (results available on request).     
31 An alternative argument would be the following. Firms can try to offset a low liquidity position 
and a low ROA  by more intense marketing efforts, in a context of a likely weaker bargaining 
leverage with customers. Though empirically disentangling the two arguments is hard, we 
speculate that the first one in the main text is more convincing because, after having controlled for 
sales, it accounts for the low convenience of granting payment delays.    
32 Almost all 843 firms with a valid answer report a positive value for the ratio.  
33 Additional regressors – age, inventory turnover index –added to the basic specification in order 
to test for robustness turned out to be not significant (t statistics largely less than one).    16 
already attained: indeed, as in the case for deb, firms are more reactive (as 
indicated by the absolute values and by the statistical significance) to falling 
rather than to rising sales. An additional percentage point for marg translates in a 
cre higher by one third.  
Examining the financial determinants, r’s coefficient is negative and 
sufficiently well determined (t = 1.84): an additional percentage point implies a 8 
per cent lower cre. Both ROA
34 and quick are negatively signed and highly 
significant, confirming that more profitable and with stronger liquidity position 
firms are less keen on using a low return financial instrument such as TC. A 
change in quick from the first percentile to the median value (around 30 
percentage points; see Table 12) implies a reduction for cre by slightly over one 
point; a similar reduction is produced by almost two additional points in ROA. 
Finally, like for deb, the influence of customary nationwide practices 
across sectors is signaled by the strong rejection of the joint zero restrictions on 
SETT dummies, whereas the same restriction is easily accepted for the REG 
dummies; also rejected is the joint zero restriction for the type regressors
35. As 
expected,  exp is strongly significant: an additional percentage point implies a 
lower cre by more than one tenth of point. 
The more interesting feature is however the significance (t = 1.88) and the 
negative sign for the novel variable disc. It is true that this result is to be 
considered with some caution, because the relatively large practice of discount 
offers, suggested from the answers to the questionnaire, looks hardly compatible 
with the low proportion of firms in the same sample acknowledging to receive 
discount offers
36. A first attempt at clarifying the issue is provided in columns 2 
and 3, which report, as in Table 6, estimates for firms who state they do/do not 
offer discounts to Italian parties for earlier settlements. Indeed, besides providing 
an overall check for robustness of the estimated basic specification on samples 
reduced by a half, a comparison of columns (1) and (2)  shows that the r and disc 
                                                            
34 The estimated coefficients for negative and positive ROA  are  very similar and the equality 
restriction is easily accepted. 
35 The pattern of the coefficient signs (estimates not reported here, available on request) is easily 
interpretable: the typology of sale markets reduce the credit period the higher the proportion of 
sales through own distributive channels to detailers or to wholesalers and the lower acting as a 
counterpart to the public sector or as a subcontractor.     
36 Note, however, that a qualitatively similar remark applies also in the US case, though 
considering two different samples. According to Ng et al. (1999), around a quarter of   17 
coefficients double in absolute value and become more strongly significant; 
unsurprisingly, looking at column (3), the transactions variables turn out to be 
relatively more relevant. 
Column (4) reports the estimates for the basic specification augmented for 
the deb regressor. In spite of the risks of reverse causation (see e.g. Petersen-
Rajan 1997, fn. 16) in the intuitive argument that the capability to extend the 
credit period is positively correlated with the length of payment delays obtained, it 
is interesting to note that  the additional regressor enters with the expected sign, 
has a sizably effect (an additional percentage point implies a larger by more than a 
fourth of point of cre) and, though highly significant, does not alter the estimates 
reported in column (1) for the main variables coefficients.  
4.1.3 Net trade credit 
TC taken and granted are not close substitutes, being the first primarily a 
financial instrument and the second one mostly a marketing one; net TC, though 
useful to compute some aggregate financial structure indicators, can thus hardly 
be “explained” at the micro level. The estimated net TC (as a ratio to sales) 
reduced form equations have then to be rather interpreted as another way to check 
on how robust are the results so far obtained for the two gross components. The 
maintained hypothesis is that, because almost three quarters of firms have positive 
net TC stocks (see also fn. 18), the explanatory variables be overall those of TC 
given
37.  
The estimated equation (Table 8, column (1)) carries no surprises. Rather 
precisely estimated, and negatively signed, is the r coefficient (an additional 
percentage point translates into lower cre by almost one fifth of point); marginally 
significant (t = 1.55) is disc (an additional percentage point implies lower cre by 
more than half a point). The distinction between negatively and positively valued 
ROA and g helps to pick the net effect, their coefficients having the same sign in 
the cre and deb equations. Columns (2) and (3) report the estimates for the two 
subsets of firms offering/not offering discounts. The remarks on the correspondent 
                                                                                                                                                               
manufacturing firms offer discounts; in Petersen-Rajan (1997) about three quarters of small and 
medium sized firms report to have received discount offers. 
37 Also in this case, informal misspecification checks were carried out adding regressors used only 
in the TC taken equation (age, unitprch); they were always poorly significant (t statistics less than 
one).    18 
columns in Table 7 apply here as well; an additional one is that the disc and r 
coefficients show absolute values larger three and two times, respectively.  
4.2 A closer look at the dimensional effect 
In order to examine more closely the link between TC and firms’ size, a 
recurring theme in the literature as previously remarked, the last column in Tables 
6-8 shows the estimated basic specification (column 1) augmented with four 
(additive) dummies, one for each of the first four quintiles (defined over the 1549 
firms in the sample)  by total assets. It turns out that, besides a further support for 
the robustness of the estimates in column 1, dimension matters, because the joint 
zero restriction on dummies is soundly rejected; after having controlled for the 
other determinants, an inverse relation seems to come out for (the ratio to sales of) 
gross and net TC and, though less neatly, for deb
38 as well.  
Using additive, rather than (also) multiplicative dummies could, however, 
fail to fully account for the effects of a different dimension on determining the 
reactivity to the determinants of TC granted and received. For this reason, tables 
9-11 report the estimates of the basic specifications for deb,  cre and net TC, 
splitting the sample between firms with total assets in the lower three quintiles 
(column 1), in the upper two quintiles (column 2), in the lower four quintiles 
(column 3) and in the upper quintile (column 4). 
Table 9 roughly confirms the estimates for deb in Table 6; the interesting 
differential feature between larger firms (column 4) and the other ones is the loss 
of statistical significance for marg and for ROA and a greater reactivity to sales 
reductions. The first two phenomena are compatible with the role attributed to 
liquidity risk, the two variables are indicators of: this risk is likely to be rather low 
for suppliers to large firms, and at any rate overwhelmed by the ability of the 
latter to translate to suppliers, through lengthened payment delays, the effects of 
reduced sales. The age coefficient, negatively signed and more significant for the 
not so large firms, could hint to younger firms having more difficulties in getting 
bank rather than commercial credit. 
Also Table 10 suggests some interesting differences between large and 
other firms in explaining cre. First, the reactivity of former ones to r is almost 
negligible, as it could be expected because of the prevailing use as a marketing   19 
tool. Though less neatly, compared with Table 9, also the objective of sales 
stabilization turns out to be more relevant for larger firms.  A plausible 
interpretation is that they are better, being less financially constrained, at 
smoothing their cycle
39.  Less easily rationalizable is the loss of statistical 
significance for marg: larger firms should be more able to implement a policy of 
price differentiation, though the puzzling result fits the reduced significance, 
compared to smaller firms, of disc. As expected, belonging to a group can help to 
raise the borrower’s standing of medium-sized firms (not of smaller ones; 
compare columns (1) and (3)); it does not really matter for larger firms.  
Table 11 for net TC provide no additional insights compared to Tables 9 
and 10.  
4.3 Related empirical studies 
An assessment of the results so far examined in comparison with those of 
the few available empirical studies is severely hindered, because of the impact on 
trade credit features to be examined, by the highly country-specific legal and 
institutional context and by the definition of the sectors firms belong to. More 
specifically on this last issue, US (Elliehausen-Wolken 1993, Petersen-Rajan 
1997) and French (Dietsch-Krémp 1998) studies include, besides manufacturing, 
as in the panel data Italian and Spanish studies, also construction and service 
industries, among which large retailers, with sizable monopsonistic power in 
product markets and ample recourse to credit to final consumers. 
To my knowledge, this is the first paper in the Italian literature examining 
a cross-section of firms; previous studies were based on accounts data for a fixed 
number of manufacturing firms included in the Centrale dei Bilanci database 
(averaged panel data for 24 cells: 4 Pavitt macrosectors by 6 dimensional – sales – 
subsets; see Marotta 1997b) or on times series of aggregated data for medium-
sized and large firms included in the Mediobanca database (Marotta 1997a). 
Bearing in mind the heterogeneity of the samples under scrutiny, two of 
the key results in Marotta (1997b) are confirmed: 
                                                                                                                                                               
38 Similar results are obtained when using, as a size criterion, sales (ordered by quintiles) instead 
of total assets.  
39 Of course, the credit period lengthening is partly imputable, rather than to own choices, to the 
mechanical worsening of contracting parties’  conditions.   20 
1.  the greater reactivity to the cost of external (mostly bank) 
borrowing in the equation for deb rather than for cre, as expected because of the 
marketing role for TC granted; 
2.  the lengthening of credit and debt periods, as a way to partially 
offset reductions in sales, practiced more intensely by larger firms. 
A third result - the negatively, instead of positively, signed quick 
coefficient in the cre equation -   fits actually better the basic assumption of this 
study, namely that better financially managed firms are reluctant to invest in a low 
return instrument such as TC. 
5. Concluding comments 
A first contribution of this study is to provide detailed information on the 
cost of interfirm credit in the Italian manufacturing sector, exploiting a 
questionnaire included in the 1994 edition of the triennial Mediocredito Centrale 
survey. The empirical evidence supports the argument that the Italian case is 
different from the one usually considered as “normal”, instead of being 
acknowledged to be confined to the US experience (and perhaps to the German 
one), with a cost hierarchy between commercial credit and the cheaper bank 
credit. The main justifications are the low percentage of suppliers offering 
discounts for quicker settlements, the agreed long credit periods, the low 
incidence of penalties for late payments, mostly because of a legal-institutional 
environment that does not effectively protect creditors’ rights. Further evidence 
against a cost hierarchy can be inferred comparing a set of indicators computed 
separately for firms acknowledging to/not to have had difficulties in obtaining 
bank credit. 
A puzzling, though not uncommon,  result is the relatively large 
percentage (about a half) of firms acknowledging they offer discounts for debt 
settlements one month earlier than the agreed date and, at the same time, the very 
low percentage (less than one tenth) of firms who declare they receive discount 
offers by their suppliers. It is true, though, even in this case, that combining the 
effective credit periods (agreed plus delays) and the size of offered discounts, the 
estimated interest rate differential between commercial and bank credit is by far 
lower than in the US experience.   21 
Another contribution is the first cross-section econometric analysis on a 
large set of firms. Some findings are worth commenting: first, firms are reactive to 
the external funding cost, most especially considering TC taken rather than 
granted, a result that fits the prevailing marketing role of the latter; second, more 
profitable or more liquid firms are reluctant to invest in a low return instrument 
such as TC; third, the discount offered enters with the expected negative sign in 
the explaining equation for the TC to sales ratio; fourth, splitting the sample 
between firms declaring to/not to offer discounts for quicker settlements, the 
former show overall a greater reactivity, for both TC taken and offered, to 
financial determinants rather than to transaction ones, a result that fits a  superior 
expertise in an integrated economic and financial management.  
An attempt at econometrically investigating whether size affects firms’ 
behavior shows that the upper (total assets) quintile is comparatively less reactive 
to financial determinants and that debt and credit periods are modified more 
intensely, in order to partially offset cyclical  sales (and above all sales 
reductions). A further finding, worth to be explored more carefully in later 
research, is the low statistical significance, for larger firms compared to others, of 
two variables – gross profit to sales margin and discount offered – in the 
explanatory equation of TC granted.  
The main objective of future research are three. The first is to investigate 
the characteristics of firms answering the questionnaire, in order to better assess 
the possible biases, in the information set so far produced and analyzed, because 
of the patterns of missing values. The second is to explore finer subsets of firms, 
defined according to the answers provided to the questionnaire or to indicators of 
financial stress or idiosyncratic characteristics (age, types of competitors), in order 
to further test the rather surprising robustness of the estimates so far obtained. The 
third one is to simulate the effects on firms’ accounts of the new legislations – the 
Italian one already passed and the soon to be implemented EU directive - on credit 
periods and on late payments penalties.   22 
Appendix 1. The data 
Trade debt and credit questionnaire 
1.  What’s the average period for commercial debt in 1994? 
2.  How many suppliers (per cent) that offered in 1994 payment delays proposed 
also a discount for quicker settlements? 
3.  What’s the average monthly discount for quicker settlements, i.e. the percent 
price reduction a firm can obtain on average anticipating the settlement by one month (e.g. cash 
instead of paying thirty days later)? 
4.  In 1994, what percentage of trade debt was settled by the firm beyond the agreed 
date and what was the average extra delay? 
5.  During 1994, what percentage of commercial debt, settled beyond the agreed 
date, implied an effective pecuniary penalty? 
6.  What’s the average pecuniary penalty imposed by suppliers, as a percentage of 
price, for each month of delay? 
7.  What’s the average monthly discount for quicker settlements, i.e. the per cent 
price reduction the firm offers to its buyers if they pay one month earlier than agreed (e.g. cash 
instead of paying thirty days later)? 
 
Rationing in the bank credit market questionnaire 
 
1.  In 1994, has the firm applied for but not obtained more bank loans? 
2.  In 1994, would the firm have accepted tighter terms (higher interest rates or more 
collateral) in order to obtain more bank loans? 
 
The dataset used  
 
The information processed refers to a subset of 1549 firms out of the original 
Mediocredito Centrale survey. Firms were selected if the 1994 accounts information were 
consistent and plausible (e.g. non-negative depreciation charges): violating this minimal criterion 
was considered to cast doubts on any other information gathered on the firm. For each item of the 
questionnaire, 1549 is the upper limit for the valid answers. The following variables (mostly 
indicators computed on accounts data) took implausible values and were accordingly recoded to 
the 99° percentile:  implied cost for external debt, quick ratio, 1993 and 1994 positive sales growth 
rates, 1993 negative sales growth rate, ratio to sales of trade credit, ratio to purchases of trade debt. 
For details on variables computation see Appendix 2. 
 
Appendix 2: The regressors 
 
Indicators, in percentage points, computed on firms’ 1994 accounts data: 
-  ratio to sales of trade credit (cre);   23 
-  ratio to purchases of trade debt (deb); 
-  ratio to sales of net trade credit; 
-  implied borrowing cost ( r ), computed as ratio of financial charges to bank 
lending and bonds (average of end-1993 and end-1994 stock data); 
-  growth rate of sales (g); 
-  ROA, computed as gross returns to total assets ratio; 
-  quick ratio, computed as liquid assets to short term liabilities, net of commercial 
items; 
-  purchases per supplier (unitprch): ratio of total purchases to the average number 
of suppliers (questionnaire information), in logs. 
Direct information from the questionnaire (percentage points): 
-  monthly discount for 30 days earlier than the agreed date settlement (disc), see 
question 7. in Appendix 1; 
-  proportion of exported sales (exp); 
-  firm belonging to a group: binary variable; 
-  type of sales market (type):      
a)  direct sales to detailers (through own commercial organization); 
b)  sales to public sector parties; 
c)  sales to wholesalers; 
d)  sales to other non final consumers customers; 
e)  proportion of sales on committement by other firms; 
f)  subcontracting as a proportion of total sales. 
Other firms' characteristics: 
-  age : ln (1+1994-birth year); 
- Pavitt  sector (SETT): 3 binary variables, assuming values 1/0 if the firm 
belongs/does not belong to the traditional sector, to the scale one, to the 
specialization one; 
-  macroregion (REG): 3 binary variables, assuming values 1/0 if the firm is/is not 
in the  North-West regions, in the North-East regions, in the Central regions.     24 
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  
 





days of delay  % payments 
within 
agreed date 




France 58  10  31.6  5.3 
Germany 34  7  63.2  7.0 
Italy 87  22  43.2  12.7 
Spain 74  6     
United 
Kingdom 







Table 2.  
 










Belgium 45-90  17  53 
France 60-90  16  57.9 
Germany 30-60  11  79 
Italy 60-120  17  62.1 
Netherlands 25-40  17 49.8 
Portugal 60-90  n.d.  n.d. 
Spain 60-90  n.d.  n.d. 
United 
Kingdom 
30-60 15  60.3 
 
Source: Dun & Bradstreet (2000)  
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 198
average 103.7 133.3 6.2 1.0 298.6 22.0 8.7 10.0 29.6
median 98.7 122.4 6.2 0.7 124.0 18.2 0.3 10.9 23.0
2^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 215
average 115.3 136.1 6.5 0.9 247.4 19.2 7.3 14.4 48.2
median 111.3 127.6 5.2 0.6 129.3 16.4 6.8 11.7 40.0
3^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 229
average 126.1 135.6 9.9 0.9 193.0 18.0 7.1 15.9 67.8
median 121.3 129.2 8.9 0.7 129.2 15.3 6.8 11.3 60.0
4^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 309 244
average 131.9 141.8 10.2 1.0 196.0 16.6 7.1 14.7 83.6
median 123.5 130.1 9.2 0.7 117.2 13.6 6.4 12.2 75.5
5^ (no of firms) 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 235
average 142.1 134.7 14.7 1.2 176.3 17.3 6.6 12.8 144.8
median 130.0 130.3 11.1 0.8 115.8 13.6 6.2 10.5 123.0
quintiles (sales)
1^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 198
average 124.3 156.4 8.0 1.2 285.6 20.7 6.5 4.8 29.1
median 112.0 137.9 7.3 0.9 139.2 16.6 6.4 5.8 23.0
2^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 224
average 124.3 139.1 9.7 0.9 266.8 19.0 7.5 11.4 52.8
median 120.2 129.3 8.3 0.7 121.9 16.1 6.5 10.6 46.0
3^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 309 226
average 127.8 140.4 10.0 0.9 187.7 17.7 7.3 19.7 66.8
median 121.5 130.4 8.8 0.7 127.6 15.0 7.2 12.0 62.5
4^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 235
average 127.0 130.9 10.2 0.9 172.1 17.9 7.2 15.1 87.2
median 119.6 127.9 8.5 0.6 124.4 14.5 6.5 13.0 78.0
5^ (no of firms) 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 238
average 115.7 114.6 9.6 1.0 199.1 17.7 8.2 16.8 138.7
median 110.6 116.3 8.9 0.6 108.2 13.5 7.4 13.8 115.5
total (no of firms) 1549 1549 1549 1549 1549 1549 1549 1548 1121
average 123.8 136.3 9.5 1.0 222.3 18.6 7.4 13.6 76.9
1^ quartile   81.6 99.5 -1.0 0.3 45.5 11.2 4.1 -1.7 33.0
median 116.3 128.1 8.3 0.7 122.5 15.1 6.8 11.3 60.0
3^ quartile 154.0 159.0 19.0 1.3 264.4 21.7 10.4 24.6 97.5
Table 4
Economic and financial indicators of manufacturing firms (1994 data)





















Source: own calculation from Mediocredito Centrale (1997).
1 Outstanding bank loans and bonds to net worth ratio.
2 Ratio of financial charges to outstanding bank
loans and bonds (average of end-1993 and end-1994 data). 
3 Gross operating profits over total assets.not rationed
1
(no of firms) 905 905 905 905 905 904 905 853 905 905 790 694 903
average 33.8 37.9 9.1 0.9*** 233.6 58.4*** 18.2 337,5 7.6 13.4 6.4 39.5 79.4**
median 32.7 35.8 8.4 0.7 120.0 31.6 14.9 5.0 6.8 12.7 4.1 34.7 64.0
standard deviation 15.9 15.9 17.3 0.9 592.7 76.6 11.4 6154.0 8.2 22.5 24.7 29.5 66.8
rationed
1
 (no of firms) 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 53 58 58 52 42 58
average 34.3 38.9 7.9 1.3*** 327.6 28.9*** 17.6 20.6 5.9 14.7 2.0 46.0 62.1**
median 33.8 36.9 6.9 1.1 184.4 18.0 16.0 6.5 6.3 12.6 5.6 47.5 47
standard deviation 15.7 18.2 17.0 1.2 604.6 31.7 8.7 65.7 7.6 28.1 20.1 31.8 45.0
not rationed
2
(no of firms) 902 902 902 902 902 901 902 850 902 902 786 687 900
media 33.8 38.0 9.1 0.9** 236.3 57.9* 18.1 338.1 7.6 13.5 6.3 40.1 78.6
median 32.4 35.7 8.4 0.7 120.9 31.7 14.8 4.4 6.8 12.8 4.2 35.0 62.5
standard deviation 15.8 16.1 17.4 0.9 604.9 75.1 11.4 6164.9 8.4 23.0 24.5 29.6 66.5
rationed
2
 (no of firms) 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 56 61 61 56 49 61
average 34.5 37.5 8.8 1.2** 283.1 40.4* 18.7 32.1 6.6 13.0 3.9 36.7 75.3
median 34.9 38.6 6.7 0.9 203.0 21.2 16.2 10.6 6.7 11.6 3.7 30.0 60.0
standard deviation 16.8 14.6 14.7 1.4 389.9 77.5 8.6 84.1 4.8 20.7 23.7 30.0 57.0
Table 5


























Source: own calculation from Mediocredito Centrale (1997). For how the indicators are computed see Table 4 and Appendix 2. The exponents 1 and 2 indicate the rationed/not rationed firms according to the
















r: implied borrowing cost (%) 0.17 0.27 0.08 0.17 0.19
(3.96) (4.39) (1.33) (3.65) (4.48)
marg: gross operating profits to sales margin (%) 0.44 0.51 0.33 0.62 0.41
(5.53) (4.43) (2.83) (6.53) (5.17)
ROA <=0 (%) -0.88 -1.25 -0.71 -0.68 -0.86
(5.64) (3.62) (3.80) (3.30) (5.60)
ROA >0 (%) -0.54 -0.78 -0.37 -0.73 -0.51
(5.75) (5.05) (2.89) (6.38) (5.37)
unitprch:purchases per supplier (log) -2.07 -1.90 -2.29 -2.01 -2.54
(4.70) (2.91) (3.68) (4.29) (5.45)
g t: non positive sales growth rate (%) -0.24 -0.16 -0.28 -0.30 -0.24
(4.03) (1.61) (3.58) (4.36) (4.11)
g t: positive sales growth rate (%) 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.03
(1.07) (0.47) (1.71) (1.24) (1.11)
g t-1: non positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.13 0.01 -0.21 -0.06 -0.13
(2.54) (0.14) (2.98) (1.00) (2.53)
g t-1: positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.07
(2.31) (0.27) (2.76) (1.90) (2.32)
age: ln (1+ firm's age) -1.17 -1.46 -0.71 -0.56 -1.52
(1.65) (1.39) (0.72) -(0.75) (2.14)
total assets (1^ quintile) -4.00
(2.21)
total assets (2^ quintile) -1.65
(1.09)
total assets (3^ quintile) -1.08
(0.76)
total assets (4^ quintile) 2.54
(1.87)
No of observations 957 421 511 736 957
R
2 c 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.24
DW 1.95 1.82 2.04 1.92 1.98
Test su joint zero restrictions
   Pavitt macrosectors F(3,935)=9.81
   macroregions F(3,935)=0.15
   buyers' markets typology F(6,935)=8.43
   total assets size F(4,931)=4.25
In bold characters: coefficients and test statistics significantly different from zero at 5 per cent or less.
(2) e (3): firms offering/not offering discounts for payments 30 days or less earlier than the agreed date to Italian customers, 
not belonging to their group; (4) firms acknowledging sales abroad.
Dependent variable: trade debt as a per cent ratio of purchases (deb)
OLS; t-statistic in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt sectors and regions and buyers' type 
regressors not reported
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Table 7
r: implied borrowing cost (%) -0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.12 -0.06
(1.84) (2.40) (0.35) (2.82) (1.35)
marg: gross operating profits to sales margin (%) 0.35 0.20 0.47 0.19 0.30
(3.77) (1.59) (3.23) (2.01) (3.20)
ROA  (%) -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.37 -0.51
(5.50) (4.03) (3.68) (3.62) (4.93)
quick ratio end 1993 (%) -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(4.52) (2.97) (3.75) (4.90) (4.50)
discount for quicker payments (%) -0.58 -1.22 -0.59 -0.49
(1.88) (2.32) (1.97) (1.59)
g t: non positive sales growth rate (%) -0.10 0.15 -0.26 -0.01 -0.13
(1.51) (1.44) (2.91) (0.20) (1.96)
g t: positive sales growth rate (%) -0.03 -0.08 -0.00 -0.04 -0.03
(0.95) (1.79) (0.08) (1.22) (0.98)
g t-1: non positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.20 -0.23 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20
(3.19) (2.61) (1.63) (2.98) (3.345)
g t-1: positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.02
(0.45) (0.58) (0.09) (0.91) (0.55)
firm belonging to a group 2.83 2.01 3.44 3.12 1.69
(2.38) (1.14) (2.08) (2.72) (1.40)
exp: export to sales ratio (%) -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12
(5.93) (3.39) (5.00) (6.14) (6.57)
deb: trade debt as a ratio to purchases (%) 0.26
(7.44)
total assets (1^ quintile) -7.95
(4.10)
total assets (2^ quintile) -4.81
(3.03)
total assets (3^ quintile) -2.74
(1.86)
total assets (4^ quintile) -1.61
(1.17)
No of observations 722 341 380 722 722
R
2 c 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.28
DW 2.06 1.90 2.11 2.08 2.07
Test su joint zero restrictions
   Pavitt macrosectors F(3,699)=13.93
   macroregions F(3,699)=0.81
   buyers' markets typology F(6,699)=7.24
   total assets size F(695,4)=5.10
In bold characters: coefficients and test statistics significantly different from zero at 5 per cent or less.
(2) e (3): firms offering/not offering discounts for payments 30 days or less earlier than the agreed date to Italian customers, 
not belonging to their group.
Dependent variable: trade credit as a per cent ratio of sales (cre)
OLS; t-statistic in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt sectors and regions and buyers' type 
regressors not reported
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Table 8 
r: implied borrowing cost (%) -0.19 -0.38 -0.03 -0.18
(3.72) (5.03) (0.49) (3.42)
marg: gross operating profits to sales margin (%) 0.30 0.09 0.55 0.25
(2.79) (0.62) (3.38) (2.31)
ROA <=0 (%) -0.76 -0.61 -0.84 -0.75
(3.22) (1.50) (2.76) (3.20)
ROA >0 (%) -0.07 0.00 -0.27 -0.01
(0.51) (0.02) (1.40) (0.05)
quick ratio end 1993 (%) -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(4.59) (3.20) (3.72) (4.55)
discount for quicker payments (%) -0.55 -1.65 -0.49
(1.53) (2.66) (1.36)
g t: non positive sales growth rate (%) 0.11 0.43 -0.08 0.10
(1.49) (3.47) (0.75) (1.30)
g t: positive sales growth rate (%) -0.09 -0.15 -0.06 -0.09
(2.54) (2.87) (1.40) (2.61)
g t-1: non positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.24 -0.35 -0.15 -0.24
(3.45) (3.42) (1.56) (3.55)
g t-1: positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08
(1.96) (0.63) (1.47) (2.078)
firm belonging to a group 3.93 3.16 4.62 2.93
(2.88) (1.54) (2.521) (2.10)
exp: export to sales ratio (%) -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13
(5.71) (3,94) (4.23) (6.12)
total assets (1^ quintile) -7.06
(3.15)
total assets (2^ quintile) -4.38
(2.40)
total assets (3^ quintile) -3.18
(1.88)
total assets (4^ quintile) -4.18
(2.62)
No of observations 722 341 380 722
R
2 c 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.18
DW 2.04 1.98 2.03 2.03
Test su joint zero restrictions
   Pavitt macrosectors F(3,698)=4.29
   macroregions F(3,698)=1.56
   buyers' markets typology F(6,697)=1.95
   total assets size F(4,694)=3.20
In bold characters: coefficients and test statistics significantly different from zero at 5 per cent or less.
(2) e (3): firms offering/not offering discounts for payments 30 days earlier or less than the agreed date to 
Italian customers not belonging to their group.
Dependent variable: net trade credit as a ratio of sales (%)
OLS; t-statistic in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt sectors and regions and 
buyers' type regressors not reported.
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)Table 9
r: implied borrowing cost (%) 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.14
(3.41) (2.52) (3.75) (1.71)
marg: gross operating profits to sales margin (%) 0.45 0.38 0.54 0.10
(4.18) (3.09) (5.69) (0.64)
ROA <=0 (%) -0.86 -1.02 -1.02 -0.48
(5.04) (2.83) (6.11) (0.80)
ROA >0 (%) -0.51 -0.56 -0.68 0.07
(4.58) (3.13) (6.40) (0.31)
unitprch:purchases per supplier (log) -2.25 -2.57 -1.77 -2.92
(3.73) (3.67) (3.35) (3.37)
g t: non positive sales growth rate (%) -0.24 -0.28 -0.20 -0.46
(3.15) (2.86) (2.99) (3.80)
g t: positive sales growth rate (%) 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01
(1.19) (0.67) (1.16) (0.17)
g t-1: non positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.14 -0.12 -0.07 -0.27
(2.02) (1.53) (1.09) (2.80)
g t-1: positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.04
(1.15) (1.72) (1.90) (0.73)
age: ln (1+ firm's age) -2.58 -0.24 -1.62 -1.21
(2.62) (0.22) (1.90) (0.94)
No of observations 503 453 738 218
R
2 c 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.33
DW 1.88 2.03 1.98 1.78
In bold characters: coefficients and test statistics significantly different from zero at 5 per cent or less.
1Firms ranked by total assets (quintiles): (1) lower three quintiles; (2) upper two quintiles; (3) lower 4
quintiles; (4) upper quintile. 
Dependent variable: trade debt as a per cent ratio of purchases (deb) 
differently sized, by total assets, firms
1
OLS; t-statistic in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt sectors and regions 
and buyers' type regressors not reported.
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)Table 10
r: implied borrowing cost (%) -0.13 0.03 -0.10 0.02
(2.29) (0.38) (1.88) (0.18)
marg: gross operating profits to sales margin (%) 0.42 0.16 0.40 0.02
(3.78) (1.00) (3.79) (0.11)
ROA  (%) -0.60 -0.38 -0.57 -0.44
(5.20) (2.07) (5.07) (1.72)
quick ratio end 1993 (%) -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
(4.12) (2.51) (4.73) (0.84)
discount for quicker payments (%) -0.45 -0.58 -0.60 -0.39
(1.27) (1.10) (1.75) (0.53)
g t: non positive sales growth rate (%) -0.03 -0.35 -0.11 -0.17
(0.40) (3.00) (1.51) (1.05)
g t: positive sales growth rate (%) -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.05) (0.50) (0.92) (0.29)
g t-1: non positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.05 -0.29 -0.16 -0.26
(0.67) (3.14) (2.35) (2.15)
g t-1: positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05
(0.89) (0.36) (0.06) (0.70)
firm belonging to a group 0.79 3.24 3.10 0.94
(0.42) (2.00) (2.07) (0.42)
exp: export to sales ratio (%) -0.11 -0.14 -0.10 -0.16
(4.49) (4.63) (4.75) (3.78)
No of observations 354 367 534 187
R
2 c 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.23
DW 2.02 2.03 2.14 2.19
In bold characters: coefficients significantly different from zero at 5 per cent or less.
Dependent variable: trade credit as a per cent ratio of sales (cre) 
differently sized, by total assets, firms
1
OLS; t-statistic in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt sectors and regions 
and buyers' type regressors not reported.
(4)
1Firms ranked by total assets (quintiles): (1) lower three quintiles; (2) upper two quintiles; (3) lower 4
quintiles; (4) upper quintile. 
Regressors (1) (2) (3)Table 11 
r: implied borrowing cost (%) -0.24 -0.11 -0.21 -0.12
(3.85) (1.27) (3.68) (1.05)
marg: gross operating profits to sales margin (%) 0.39 0.09 0.38 -0.13
(3.14) (0.47) (3.23) (0.53)
ROA  <=0 (%) -0.91 -0.45 -0.85 -0.71
(3.79) (0.89) (3.61) (0.59)
ROA  >0 (%) -0.18 0.20 0.01 -0.16
(1.19) (0.88) (0.06) (0.52)
quick ratio end 1993 (%) -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00
(4.38) (2.44) (5.22) (0.02)
discount for quicker payments (%) -0.44 -0.51 -0.58 -0.20
(1.09) (0.82) (1.52) (0.23)
g t: non positive sales growth rate (%) 0.22 -0.14 0.09 0.11
(2.45) (0.99) (1.11) (0.58)
g t: positive sales growth rate (%) -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09
(1.17) (1.80) (1.94) (1.25)
g t-1: non positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) 0.04 -0.42 -0.16 -0.39
(0.43) (3.90) (2.12) (2.72)
g t-1: positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.13 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05
(2.89) (0.87) (1.97) (0.61)
firm belonging to a group 1.39 4.70 4.95 -0.65
(0.66) (2.45) (2.95) (0.25)
exp: export to sales ratio (%) -0.08 -0.18 -0.10 -0.20
(2.89) (5.23) (4.22) (4.01)
No of observations 354 367 534 187
R
2 c 0.25 0.17 0.2 0.2
DW 1.86 2.07 2.05 2.12
In bold characters: coefficients significantly different from zero at 5 per cent or less.
1Firms ranked by total assets (quintiles): (1) lower three quintiles; (2) upper two quintiles; (3) lower 4
quintiles; (4) upper quintile. 
Dependent variable: net trade credit as a per cent ratio of sales
differently sized, by total assets, firms
1
OLS; t-statistic in Italic; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt sectors and regions 
and buyers' type regressors not reported.
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)Table 12
no of firms average median 1° percentile 99° percentile std. dev.
regressors
cre (%) 1549 34.00 32.1 0 97.07 17.08
deb (%) 1549 37.60 35.57 5.21 110.26 16.71
net trade credit to sales (%) 1549 9.50 8.34 -35.49 63.18 19.66
r (%) 1549 18.52 15.07 3.77 66.22 11.54
g (%) 1548 12.24 11.25 -49.84 102.12 25.31
ROA (%) 1549 7.36 6.75 -18.32 31.01 8.52
quick (%) 1549 61.20 31.19 1.20 560.66 89.08
unitprch (log) 1109 3.74 3.63 1.23 6.79 1.15
disc (%) 1087 1.25 0 0 5.00 1.69
exp (%) 843 39.68 35.00 0.50 100 29.73
group 1123 0.22 0 0 1 0.41
age (log) 1123 2.93 3.00 1.10 4.54 0.71
type (%):
a) 1115 11.87 0 0 100 28.49
b) 1115 3.82 0 0 88.40 14.95
c) 1115 20.87 0 0 100 34.52
d) 1115 10.16 0 0 100 27.17
e) 1114 76.27 100 0 100 37.51












See Appendix 2 for details.